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1959] NOTES
the court pointed to the danger of a lawbook in the hands of a
non-lawyer. Yet the president of a special court-martial, al-
though not generally legally trained, is permitted to use the Man-
ual, as the court itself acknowledged. To this extent, then, the
court's reasoning appears inconsistent, for it struck down the
use of the Manual by non-lawyers, while at the same time direct-
ing one non-lawyer to use it.
It is submitted that the Court of Military Appeals should
have adhered to the pre-existing rule and reversed the court-
martial for use of the Manual only in cases where the defendant
was prejudiced, rather than formulating a rule which divests
the members of the court-martial of an important aid in carry-
ing out their functions.
A Clayton James, Jr.
NATURAL GAS ACT -CHANGES IN RATES UNDER SECTION 4(d)
United Gas Pipeline Company supplies gas to the City of
Memphis' natural gas distribution agency under long term serv-
ice agreements containing the following pricing provision: "All
gas delivered hereunder shall be paid for by Buyer under Seller's
Rate Schedule ... or any effective superseding rate schedules on
file with the Federal Power Commission." After the agreements
had been in effect several years, United, proceeding under Sec-
tion 4 (d) 1 of the Natural Gas Act,2 filed new rate schedules in-
creasing its prices. The Commission ordered a hearing 3 as to
well founded and can cite the applicable section of the Manual to the presiding
officer for support of his position.
1. Section 4(d) provides: "Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change
shall be made by any natural-gas company in any such [filed] rate, charge, classi-
fication, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except
after thirty days' notice to the Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be
given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new
schedules stating plainly the change or changes to be made in the schedule or
schedules then in force and the time when the change or changes will go into
effect. The Commission, for good cause shown, may allow changes to take effect
without requiring the thirty days' notice herein provided for by an order specifying
the changes so to be made and the time when they shall take effect and the man-
ner in which they shall be filed and published."
2. Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1952).
3. Under Section 4(e) : "Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Com-
mission shall have authority, either upon complaint of any State, municipality, or
State commission, or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if
it so orders, without answer or formal pleading by the natural-gas company, but
upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such
rate, charge, classification, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision
thereon, the Commission, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the
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the propriety of the new rates, and, except as to those relating
to sales of gas for resale for industrial use only, suspended the
effectiveness of the new rates for five months, the maximum
period authorized by statute. After the lapse of this period the
new rates went into effect. Memphis, seeking to have the in-
crease declared invalid, contended that United's unilateral act of
filing could not increase the gas rates because both the buyer
and seller would have had to agree specifically to the new rate
prior to the filing with the Commission in order for this rate to
be effective. The Commission rejected this contention and held
that the purchasers, in the service agreements, had undertaken
to pay United's "going rates," as established from time to time
by filings with the Commission. 4 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the Commission lacked "jurisdiction" to accept fil-
ings for rates where the new rates had not been specifically
agreed to by both buyer and seller.5 The Supreme Court held
(5-3) reversed. The Natural Gas Act does not prohibit filing
under Section 4(d) as a means of changing rates if the buyer
and seller contract that the rates may be changed. Business real-
ity demands that natural gas companies should not be precluded
by law from increasing the prices of their product whenever that
is the economically necessary means of keeping their revenues in
proper balance. The dissenting Justices construed Section 4 as
embracing only the rates agreed upon by the pipeline company
and the customer because the Natural Gas Act was designed to
natural-gas company affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for
such suspension, may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of
such rate, charge, classification, or service, but not for a longer period than five
months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect: Provided, That the
Commission shall not have authority to suspend the rate, charge, classification, or
service for the sale of natural gas for resale for industrial use only; and after
full hearings, either completed before or after the rate, charge, classification, or
service goes into effect, the Commission may make such orders with reference
thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective.
If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made at the expiration of
the suspension period, on motion of the natural-gas company making the filing,
the proposed change of rate, charge, classification, or service shall go into effect.
Where increased rates or charges are thus made effective, the Commission may,
by order, require the natural-gas company to furnish a bond, to be approved by
the Commission, to refund any amounts ordered by the Commission, to keep accu-
rate accounts in detail of all amounts received by reason of such increase, specify-
ing by whom and in whose behalf such amounts were paid, and, upon completion
of the hearing and decision, to order such natural-gas company to refund, with
interest, the portion of such increased rates or charges by its decision found not
justified. At any hearing involving a rate or charge sought to be increased, the
burden of proof to show that the increased rate or charge is just and reasonable
shall be upon the natural-gas company, and the Commission shall give to the hear-
ing and decision of such questions preference over other questions pending before
it and decide the same as speedily as possible."
4. 16 F.P.C. 19, 15 P.U.R.3d 279 (1956).
5. 250 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
1959] NOTES
protect consumer interests. United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Memphis
Light, Gas and Water Division, 79 S.Ct. 194 (U.S. 1959).
The Natural Gas Act of 1938 provides for rate regulation by
the Federal Power Commission. According to the act new rates
or changes in old ones can come into effect only with the Com-
mission's consent. 6 Increases in existing rates have been neces-
sary because original prices of long-term gas contracts subse-
quently became unrealistic due to inflation and the greatly in-
creased demand for natural gas. Changes in existing contract
rates must be made in either of two ways. Under Section 5 (a) 7
of the Natural Gas Act the Commission, the state, or gas distrib-
uting companies may instigate a hearing before the Commission
for a determination as to the reasonableness of proposed changes
in rates, and rates thus approved by the Commission may then
be put into force. Under Section 4(d) the pipeline companies
may file proposed changes in rates with the Commission. The
regulations of the Commission require detailed supporting data
to accompany these proposals; this data must also be made avail-
able to the distributing companies." These changes automatically
go into effect after thirty days' notice to the customer unless the
Commission on its own motion, or on motion of the customer,
suspends the effectiveness of the new rates pending a hearing
and decision. However, the maximum period of suspension is
6. The only two methods of effecting new rates, or changes in the old ones,
are by Section 4(d), in which the Commission may reject the filing if it is unsatis-
factory, and Section 5(a), in which the Commission conducts a hearing.
7. Section 5(a) provides: "Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had
upon its own motion or upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commis-
sion, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, or classifica-
tion demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in con-
nection with any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting
such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory,
or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate,
charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter ob-
served and in force, and shall fix the same by order: Provided, however, That the
Commission shall have no power to order any increase in any rate contained in
the currently effective schedule of such natural gas company on file with the Com-
mission, unless such increase is in accordance with a new schedule filed by such
natural gas company; but the Commission may order a decrease where existing
rates are unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, otherwise unlawful, or are
not the lowest reasonable rates."
Note that pipeline companies are not among the named parties; thus they have
no right to proceed under Section 5(a). However, the Commission often instigates
a hearing in its own name at the request of pipeline companies.
8. See Sections 154.34, 154.38 and 154.40 of the Federal Power Commission
Regulations. 18 C.F.R. 260 et seq. (1949). These regulations spell out, in minute
detail, the data which must be submitted. In order to be accepted by the Com-
mission the data must contain the equivalent of a prima facie case for the rate
increases.
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five months, after which the rates go into effect under bond even
if the hearing is not yet completed. Many hearings are not com-
pleted for a period of several years.9 This five-month suspension
period is not applicable to sales of gas for industrial resale; thus
as to such gas the new rates automatically go into effect after
the thirty-day period. Even if the increase in rates as to this
gas is deemed unreasonable at the hearing, the seller need not re-
fund the price. It is greatly to the seller's advantage to change
rates via the 4(d) filing method rather than request the Com-
mission to order a hearing under 5 (a) ; a 5 (a) hearing may con-
sume a great amount of time during which increased revenues
cannot be collected, whereas the rates are "effected first and liti-
gated later" under the 4(d) procedure. Also the 4(d) procedure
eliminates the time-consuming and consequently expensive neces-
sity of negotiating individually with the often very numerous
customers of the natural gas companies. Thus most rate in-
creases have been made under Section 4 (d) by the seller's act of
filing.
In 1956 a "Pandora's Box" 10 was opened by the Supreme
Court in their decision in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas
Service Corp." There the seller had contracted to supply gas at
a specific price for a ten-year period; subsequently, without con-
sent of the buyer, seller filed a higher rate with the Commission
according to Section 4(d). Th6 court held that the Commission
could not accept filings of rate changes to be effected under 4 (d)
unless these changes had been agreed to by the buyer. This de-
cision left the natural gas companies with the prospect of hav-
ing to negotiate each proposed rate change with the individual
customer, and if they could not agree then the only recourse left
to the sellers was to request the Commission to invoke a hearing
under Section 5 (a). During the often lengthy hearings the sell-
ers would have to supply gas at the original price; in a rising
economy such as ours this could lead natural gas companies to
bankruptcy.12 In this regard it is significant that approximately
9. Four years is not uncommonly long. See The "Memphis" Decision- Where
Do We Go From Here?, 62 PuB. U. FORTNIGHTLY 289, 294 (1958). This article
discussed the impact of the court of appeals' decision in the instant case.
10. See Malone, Impact of Mobile upon State Regulation of Utilities, 15 WASH.
& LEE L. Rzv. 1 (1958).
11. 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
12. For example, in a memorandum to the Supreme Court the Solicitor General
on behalf of the Federal Power Commission said: "The decision below [the court
of appeals decision in the instant case] had an immediate impact on the financing
plans of several pipelines .... [T]hree pipelines announced decisions to postpone
construction programs totaling expenditures of $183 million. ... [N]umerous mar-
[Vol. XIX
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$240 million in increased rates collected subject to refund hinged
on the outcome of the instant case.
The contract in the instant case contained a pricing clause
which was not found in the Mobile case. Here the rate was to
be the one presently on file "or any effective superseding rate
schedule on file with the commission." By adding this clause in
the service contract the parties were held to have bargained for
a changeable rate. The court stated that the Natural Gas Act did
not impinge upon the private power to make contracts; and since
the parties contracted for future changes, such changes could be
made by sellers' filings under Section 4(d). Justice Douglas in
the dissenting opinion pointed out that the condemnable action
in this case and Mobile is the same: the new rates were insti-
gated and put into effect ex parte by the seller. This, he said,
unduly sacrifices the consumer interests which the Natural Gas
Act was designed to protect.
Because some preponderance of power is allowed to the seller,
in that it can institute an effective change without a full hearing
but the buyer cannot, the all-important issue is whether or not,
from the standpoint of public policy, a public utility, a statutory
monopoly, should be allowed such power. This issue was squarely
met by Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, when he said:
"Business reality demands that natural gas companies should not
be precluded by law from increasing the prices of their product
whenever that is the economically necessary means of keeping
the intake and outgo of their revenues in proper balance; . .. "1
Apparently this decision puts the procedure for rate increases
where it was before Mobile, the only exception being that future
contracts will contain clauses similar to the one in the instant
case.
The consumer interests are still under the disadvantage that
their gas rates can be increased almost immediately, but can be
decreased only after a full hearing. This inequality could per-
haps be remedied by more expeditious proceedings under Sec-
ket reports ,by reputable security analysts . . . came to the attention of the com-
mission which uniformly recommend that their customers defer purchases of
pipeline stocks pending . . . the decision, and that investors give serious considera-
tion to disposing of pipeline securities . . . [A letter] typical of the advice given
to investors by most analysts at this time, stated that 'without clarification, the
natural gas business will be in a chaotic state' and 'the adverse ruling by the court
of appeals throws a pall over the natural gas pipeline industry.'" 62 PUBLIC UTIL-
ITIES FORTNIGHTLY 289, 296 (1958).
13. 79 Sup. Ct. 194, 200 (U.S. 1958).
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tion 5 (a). It is submitted that pre-hearing conferences, such as
is the practice in federal courts, would serve this end. 14 In a pre-
hearing conference the contested issues would be isolated and
thus the introduction and discussion of much of the voluminous
technical data ordinarily considered in a Federal Power Commis-
sion hearing would be eliminated. Such conferences would put
buyers more on a par with sellers with respect to the all-impor-
tant duration of the period of delay in effecting needed rate
changes.
Philip E. Henderson
OBLIGATIONS - INSURER'S CAUSE OF ACTION - CONVENTIONAL
AND LEGAL SUBROGATION
Plaintiff insurance company paid insured the amount of
property damage sustained by his vehicle (minus the deductible
portion) in a collision with defendant, and sued the latter for
recovery of the amount paid under the policy. The insured at the
time of payment gave to the plaintiff a written subrogation, but
later apparently made a settlement with defendant and gave him
a general rather than a restricted release.' The district court
overruled an exception of no cause of action and excluded the
purported release from evidence. On appeal by defendant to the
Orleans Court of Appeal, held, affirmed. The loss an insurance
company sustains under an insurance policy may be recovered in
a personal action brought by the insurer against the tortfeasor
under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315,2 and because of this
separate cause of action, a release of the tortfeasor has no ef-
fect. American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida v. Costa,
107 So.2d 76 (La. App. 1958).
The legal basis on which an insurance company may recover
from the tortfeasor for claims paid to an insured has been the
14. Such conferences are presently allowed to the Commission according to FPC
regulations. See 18 C.F.R. § 1.18 (1949). The Commission need only employ the
tools at hand. See Bond, The Use of Pre-Trial Technique in Administrative Hear-
ings, 13 F.C.C. BAR J. 55 (1953).
1. A general release will destroy the whole claim. On the other hand, a re-
stricted release will only settle a portion of the claim.
2. "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it. .. ."
[Vol. XIX
